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Covert Contingencies in the Right to the
Assistance of Counsel
Abraham S. Blumberg*
On the basis of a sociological survey showing that a very large percentage of guilty pleas are induced by defense counsel, Professor
Blumberg concludes that criminal justice is not structured on the adversary model which the Supreme Court's right to counsel decisions
presuppose. He submits that the primary loyalty of defense counsel is
to the criminal court "system," the informal organization of court
officials on which they depend for their professional existence. He
suggests further that the additional attorneys which will be required to
implement the right to counsel decisions will simply serve to make the
"system" more efficient in utilizing covert evasions of due process and in
producing an even greater number of guilty pleas.
This article was awarded first prize in an essay contest in sociology
sponsored by the Institute on American Freedoms.
I. INTRODUCTION

Three recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with the role of the
lawyer have been hailed as destined to effect profound changes in the
administration of criminal law in America. The first of these, Gideon

v. Wainwright,' requires states and localities to furnish counsel for
indigent persons charged with a felony. The Gideon ruling raised an
interesting question: what is the precise point in time at which a
* B.A., Brooklyn College, 1942; LL.B., Columbia University, 1947; Ph.D., New
School for Social Research, 1965; Member of New York Bar, admitted 1947; Member
of United States Supreme Court Bar, admitted 1961; presently Assistant Professor,
Dep't of Sociology, State University of New York at Stony Brook; effective Sept.,
1967, Associate Professor of Sociology and Law, John Jay College, City University of
New York.
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). This decision represented the climax of a line of cases
with respect to the right to the assistance of counsel. Earlier, Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932), had held that the right to counsel applied to the states via the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Later cases such as Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455 (1942), and Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 649 (1948), restricted the
Powell case to capital cases and to those instances where the defendant was incapable of making an adequate defense due to age, ignorance or intellectual limitations, etc. An exhaustive historical analysis- of the fourteenth amendment and the
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suspect is entitled to a lawyer? 2 The answer came relatively quickly

in Escobedo v. Illinois,3 which aroused a storm of controversy.

Danny Escobedo confessed to the murder of his brother-in-law

after the police had refused to allow retained counsel to see him,
although his lawyer was present in the station house and asked to

confer with his client. In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court
asserted that when the process of police investigation shifts from

merely investigatory to accusatory--cwhen its focus is on the accused
and its purpose is to elicit a confession-our adversary system begins

to operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be
permitted to consult with his lawyer." 4 Escobedo's confession was
rendered inadmissible, triggering a national debate among police,

district attorneys, judges, lawyers, and other law enforcement officials,
which continues unabated,5 about the value and propriety of confes-

sions in criminal cases. 6

Bill of Rights will be found in Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate
the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. Rv. 5 (1949). Since
the Gideon decision, there is evidence that its holding will be extended to indigent
persons charged with misdemeanors-and ultimately even to traffic cases and other
minor offenses. For a popular account of this development see Lmvis, GmEor's
TnuM'rr, (1964). For a scholarly historical analysis see BEANmr, THE RIHT TO
COUNSEL mr A.mzucAN CouRTs (1955).
For a more recent comprehensive review
and discussion see Note, Counsel at Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000 (1964).
Under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964), indigents accused
in the federal courts will be defended by federally paid counsel. For a general
discussion of the nature and extent of public and private legal aid in the United
States prior to the Gideon case, see BnowNELT., LEGAL Am im n1E. UNITED STATES
(1961). See also VON MEHRRN, EQUAL JUsTIcE FOR THE AccusED (1959).
2. In the case of federal defendants the issue has been clear. In Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), the Supreme Court unequivocally indicated that a
person under federal arrest must be taken "without any unnecessary delay" before a
United States Commissioner, where he will be told of his rights to remain silent and
to assistance of counsel which will be furnished, if he is indigent, under the Criminal
Justice Act of 1964. For a richly documented work in connection with the general
area of the Bill of Rights, see Sowxvr., Pouca Powna AND INDvrmuAL FxEOM (1962).
3. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
4. Id. at 492.
5. For some measure of the intensity of the controversy see Finley, Who is on
Tfial-The Police? The Courts? or the Criminally Accused, J CmM. L., C. & P.S.
379 (1966).
6. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1965, p. 1, col. 5, for Justice Nathan B. Sobel's statement
to the effect that based on his study of 1,000 indictments in Brooklyn, N.Y., from
February to April, 1965, fewer than 10% involved confessions. See Sobel, The Exclusionary Rules in the Law of Confessions: A Legal Perspective-A PracticalPerspective
(pts. 1-6), N.Y.L.J., Nov. 15-21, 1965. Most law enforcement officials believe that the
majority of convictions in criminal cases are based upon confessions obtained by police.
For example, the District Attorney of New York County (a jurisdiction which has the
largest volume of cases in the United States), Frank S. Hogan, reports that confessions are crucial and indicates "if a suspect is entitled to have a lawyer during
preliminary questioning . . . any lawyer worth his fee will tell him to keep his
mouth shut." N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1965, p. 1, col. 2. Concise discussions of the issue
are to be found in Dowling, Escobedo and Beyond: The Need for a Fourteenth
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Subsequently, on June 13, 1966, in another five to four decision, the
Court underscored the principle enunciated in Escobedo in the case
of Miranda v. Arizona.7 An accused must be advised of his right to
remain silent and to have an attorney. Police interrogation of any
suspect in custody, without his consent, unless a defense attorney is
present, is prohibited by the self-incrimination provision of the fifth
amendment.
In the Gideon, Escobedo, and Miranda cases, the Supreme Court
reiterated the traditional legal conception of a defense lawyer. As
counsel in an adversary, combative proceeding, he assiduously musters
all the admittedly limited resources at his command to defend the
accused.8 But does the Supreme Court's conception of the role of
counsel in a criminal case square with social reality? Is the Court's
assumption warranted that in these cases defense counsel will conduct
a combative, adversary defense of the accused?
The varied organizational contexts in which the defense counsel
acts, and in which the dimensions of his role are structured, have not
been considered by the Court in these cases. Perhaps at the "gatehouse" level (police, prosecution) it would be a simple matter for any
lawyer to advise a client to remain silent. But at the "mansion" level
(criminal court) there is a very limited understanding of the real
functions of defense counsel.9 Much judicial attention has traditionally
been focused upon the oppressive features of the gatehouse level of
the criminal process, with but scant attention given to the mansion
where it is assumed, other things being equal, the ends of due process
Amendment Code of Criminal Procedure, 56 J. CRm. L., C. & P.S. 143 (1965);
Robinson, Massiah, Escobedo and RationalesFor the Exclusion of Confessions, Id. at 412.
7. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8. Even under optimal circumstances a criminal case is a one-sided affair, the
parties to the "contest" being decidedly unequal in strength and resources. See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69
YALE L.J. 1149 (1960).
9. I am here employing the metaphors utilized by Yale Kamisar in contrasting
the questionable procedures of the police (gatehouse) with the orderly, protective
measures in the mansion (courtroom). See KAMnsAR, INBAU & ARNOLD, CRnvIaNL
JUsTICE IN Oura Tnsz 19-20 (1965). Similar "ideal types" are employed by Heibert
L. Packer who has recently analyzed our system of criminal justice in terms of a
two-model process. The first is designated a "Crime Control Model." This version
of criminal justice is characterized by a presumption of guilt, assembly line speed and
efficiency in processing large numbers of defendants. The Crime Control Model
balances the interests of the individual and society, and it is the individual interests
which often have to give way. The other system is termed the Due Process Model.
Here we find the system of criminal justice to be a legalistic obstacle course consisting
of "quality inputs" which is anticipated will serve the needs and rights of individual defendants. Individualization in terms of quality at the' expense of quantity
is emphasized in this model of criminal justice. After indicating that a really efficient
system of criminal justice based on the Crime Control Model would be repressive,
Packer concludes that the trend in America is toward the Due Process Model. See
Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L.. REv. 1. (1964).
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will be served. However, the Supreme Court, in seeking to protect
the rights of a defendant in a criminal case, has in these decisions
failed to take into account three crucial aspects of life in the courts
which may tend to render the more liberal rules ineffectual. The
decisions tend to overlook:
1) The informal structure of courts as characterized by bureaucratic goals other than the formal, traditional goals of due
process.
2) The real nature of the relationship of lawyers and other
professionals with the court organization.
3) The actual dimensions of the lawyer-client relationship in the
criminal court, as opposed to the "glamorous" and "heroic"
one depicted in the movies, TV, novels, and the press.
It is the purpose of this paper to attempt to clarify some of these
features of court organization both as they relate to the legal profession and as they structure it.
II. METHODS

The data for this study are drawn from a major American criminal
court system which, for convenience, I will call Metropolitan Court.
It is not a single court, but a series of interrelated criminal courts
dealing with criminal charges ranging from minor infractions of the
law to felonies. Metropolitan Court is one of the largest criminal
courts in the country in terms of case volume and personnel employed.
The data have a national applicability because many of the organizational and occupational characteristics found in the Metropolitan
Court setting are also featured in criminal courts throughout the
country.

Much of the data were gathered during the course of nearly twenty
years of work experience in almost every activity related to the
administration of the criminal law, including the practice of criminal
law. For almost five years prior to the close of that period, when it
became apparent to me that I wanted to set down my observations
about aspects of the American system of criminal justice, I began
systematically to interview most of the personnel and officials conducting business in Metropolitan Court. During that latter interval, approximately two hundred persons were interviewed and re-interviewed
to test my observations and conclusions. Thus, most of the lawyers,
probation officers, court clerks, psychological and psychiatric personnel, district attorneys, and other officials, such as parole officers, who
may only occasionally conduct business in Metropolitan Court, were
observed and interviewed. More than two thousand psychiatric and.

1967 ]

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

probation reports were read. Over seven hundred felony defendants
were interviewed in detail about their court experience. Approximately
three hundred trials, and over fifteen hundred pleas of guilty to a
lesser offense including some of the preliminary negotiations involved
were observed. In addition, during the summers of 1960 through 1965,
criminal courts in some of the major urban areas of the country
were visited, as well as several rural courts in the New England
area.
III. COURT ORGANIZATION AS A VARIABLE CONTRIBUTING
TO CRMMNAL CONVCTION

There is by now ample evidence that the overwhelming majority
of convictions in criminal cases (often over 90%) are not the product
of a combative, trial-by-jury process at all, but instead merely involve
the sentencing of the individual after a negotiated, bargained-for plea
of guilty has been entered. 10 Although more recently the overzealous
role of police and prosecutors in producing pretrial confessions and
admissions has achieved a good deal of notoriety, scant attention has
been paid to the organizational structure and personnel of the
criminal court itself. Indeed, the extremely high conviction rate
produced without the features of an adversary trial in our courts
tends to suggest that the "trial" becomes a perfunctory reiteration
and validation of the pretrial interrogation and investigation.'
In that institutional setting, the actual role of defense counsel in a
criminal case is radically different from the one traditionally depicted.' 2
Sociologists and others have focused their attention on the deprivations
and social disabilities of such variables as race, ethnicity, and social
class as being the source of an accused person's defeat in a criminal
10. Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations:A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J.
CraM. L., C. & P.S. 780 (1954). Newman's data covered only one year, 1954, in a
midwestern community. However, it is in general confirmed by my own data drawn
from a far more populous area, and from one of the largest criminal courts in
the country, for a period of fifteen years from 1950 to 1964 inclusive. The English
experience tends also to confirm American data. See WM.uAn, CRINM Am PUNIsIxmwxT IN BarTAIN: AN ANALYsIs OF Tim PENAL SysTm

(1965).

See also NEwmAN,

CONVICTON: THm DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WrrnouT Tm.

3 (1966);

SIVErSTEmN, DEFENSE OF Tim PooR 90 (1965).
The Soviet trial has been termed by
11. FaraRi, JuSTICE IN Moscow (1965).
Feifer "an appeal from the pretrial investigation," and he notes that the Soviet "trial"
is simply a recapitulation of the data collected by the pretrial investigator. The
notions of a trial being a tabula rasa and presumptions of innocence are wholly alien
to Soviet notions of justice. ". . . the closer the investigation resembles the finished
script, the better .... " Id. at 86.
12. For a concise statement of the constitutional and economic aspects of the
right to legal assistance, see PAursEN, EQUAL JUsTICE FOR Tim POOR MAN (1964).
For a brief traditional description of the legal profession see Freund, The Legal
Profession, in DAEDALUS 689 (1963).
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court. Largely overlooked is the variable of the court organization
itself, which possesses a thrust, purpose and direction of its own. It is
grounded in values, bureaucratic priorities and administrative instruments, all of which exalt maximum production and the particularistic
designs for career enhancement of organizational incumbents. Their
occupational and career commitments tend to generate a set of
priorities, exerting a higher claim than the stated ideological goal of
"due process of law," and is often inconsistent with such a goal.
Organizational goals and discipline impose a set of demands and
conditions of practice on the respective professions in the criminal
court, to which they respond by abandoning their ideological and
professional commitments to the accused client, in the service of the
higher claims of the court organization. All the court personnel,
including the accused's own lawyer, are co-opted to become agentmediators 13 who help the accused redefine his situation and restructure
his perceptions concomitant with a plea of guilty.
IV. THE SociAL STmCrUR

OF ThE CRMNAL COURT

A. The "Lawyer Regular"
At the outset, one must distinguish between the 'lawyer regulars,"
i.e., those defense lawyers, who by virtue of their continuous appearances in behalf of defendants, tend to represent the bulk of a criminal
court's non-indigent case workload, and those lawyers who are not
"regulars," but who appear almost casually in behalf of an occasional
client. Some of the "lawyer regulars" are highly visible as one moves
about the major urban centers of the nation. Their offices line the back
streets of the courthouses, at times sharing space with bondsmen.
Their political "visibility" in terms of local clubhouse ties, reaching into
the judges' chambers and prosecutors' offices, is also deemed essential
to successful practitioners. Previous research has indicated that the
"lawyer regulars" make no effort to conceal their dependence upon
police, bondsmen, jail personnel, and the necessity for maintaining
intimate relations with all levels of personnel connected with the
court as a means of obtaining, maintaining, and building their
practice. These informal relations are the sine qua non not only of
retaining a practice, but also in the negotiation of pleas and sentences. 14 Of all the occupational roles in the court the only private
13. I use the concept in the general sense Coffman employed in
ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SruAION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND OiEI

GOFFmAN, ASYLUMlS:
INMATES (1961).

14. CARLIN, LAwYERs ON ThEm OwN 105-09 (1962); GOLDFARB, ILANsoM-A
C=rIQuE OF THE A i acAN BArn SYsTEm 114-15 (1965); Wood, Informal Relations

in the Practice of Criminal Law, 62 AM. J. Soc. 48 (1956). In connection with
relatively recent data on recruitment to the legal profession, and variables involved
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individual who is officially recognized as having a special status and
concomitant obligations is the lawyer. His legal status is that of
"officer of the court," and he is held to a standard of ethical performance and duty both to his client and to the court. This obligation is
thought to be far higher than that expected of ordinary individuals
occupying the various occupational statuses in the court community.
However, lawyers, whether privately retained or of the legal-aid,
public-defender variety, have close and continuing relations with the
prosecuting office and the court itself through discreet relations with
the judges via the latters' law secretaries or "confidential" assistants.
Indeed, lines of communication, influence and contact with those
offices, as well as with the clerk of the court, probation division, and
the press, are essential to present and prospective requirements of
criminal law practice. Similarly, the subtle involvement of the press
and other mass media in the court's organizational network, which
are present in the physical setting, is not readily discernible to the
casual observer. Accused persons come and go in the court system
scheme, but the structure and its occupational incumbents remain
to carry on their respective career, occupational and organizational
enterprises. The individual tensions and conflicts a given accused
person's case may present to all the participants are overcome because
the formal and informal relations of all the groups in the court setting
require it. The probability of continued future relations and interaction must be preserved at all costs.
B. The Client and the Press
The client, then, is a secondary figure in the court system as in
certain other bureaucratic settings.15 He becomes a means to other,
larger ends of the organization's incumbents. Doubts, contingencies,
and pressures that he may present, which challenge existing informal
arrangements or are disruptive of them, tend to be resolved in favor
of the continuance of the organization and the maintenance of its
relations as before. There is a greater community of interest among
all the principal organizational structures and their incumbents than
exists elsewhere in other settings. The accused's lawyer has far
greater professional, economic, intellectual and other ties to the
in the type of practice engaged in, see Ladinsky, Careers of Lawyers, Law Practice,

and Legal Institutions, 28 Am. SocIoLocrcc.L RFv. 47 (1963).

See also WARxov &

ZELAN, LAwYEms IN THE MA=G (1965).

15. There is a real question to be raised as to whether in certain organizational
settings, a complete reversal of the bureaucratic ideal has not occured. That is, it
would seem, in some instances the organization appears to exist to serve the needs of
its various occupational incumbents, rather than its clients. ETzIONr, MODERN ORGANIzATONS 94-104 (1964).
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various elements of the court system than he does to his own client.
The court system is a closed community. This is more than just the
case of the usual "secrets" of bureaucracy which are fanatically defended from outside view. Even all elements of the press are zealously
determined to report only that which will not offend the board of
judges, the prosecutor, probation, legal-aid, or other officials, in return
for privileges and courtesies granted in the past and to be granted in
the future. Rather than any view of the matter in terms of some
variation of a "conspiracy" hypothesis, the simple explanation is one
of a continuing system dealing with delicate, tension- and traumaproducing law enforcement and administration, which requires a
pathological distrust of "outsiders" bordering on group paranoia.
C. Outsiders
The virtually hostile attitude toward "outsiders" is in large measure
engendered by a defensiveness produced by the inherent deficiencies
of assembly-line justice, so characteristic of our major criminal courts.
Intolerably large caseloads of defendants, which must be disposed
of in an organizational context of limited resources and personnel,
potentially subject the participants in the court community to harsh
scrutiny from appellate courts, and other public and private sources
of condemnation. As a consequence, an almost irreconcilable conflict
is posed in terms of intense pressures to process large numbers of
cases on the one hand, and the stringent ideological and legal requirements of "due process of law" on the other. A rather tenuous resolution
of the dilemma has emerged in the shape of a large variety of bureaucratically ordained and controlled short cuts, deviations, and outright
rule violations on the part of court occupational incumbents, from
judges to stenographers, in order to meet production norms. Fearfully anticipating criticism on ethical as well as legal grounds, all the
significant participants in the court's social structure are bound
into an organized system of complicity. This consists of a work
arrangement in which the patterned, covert, informal breaches, and
the evasions of "due process" are institutionalized, but are, nevertheless, denied to exist.
D. InstitutionalizedEvasions of Due Process
These institutionalized evasions occur to some degree in all criminal
courts. Their nature, scope and complexity will be largely determined
by the size of the court and the character of the community in which
it is located, e.g., whether it is a large, urban institution, or a relatively
small, rural county court. In addition, idiosyncratic, local conditions
may contribute a unique flavor to the character and quality of the
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criminal law's administration in a particular community. However, in
most instances a variety of stratagems are employed-some subtle,
some crude-in effectively disposing of what are often large caseloads.
A wide variety of coercive devices are employed against an accusedclient, couched in a depersonalized, instrumental, bureaucratic version
of due process of law, and which are in reality a perfunctory obeisance
to the ideology of due process. These include some very explicit
pressures which are exerted in some measure by all court personnel,
including judges, to plead guilty and avoid trial. In the case of
recalcitrants the sanction of a potentially harsh sentence is frequently utilized as the visible alternative to pleading guilty. Probation
and psychiatric reports are "tailored" to organizational needs, or are at
least responsive to the court organization's requirements for the
refurbishment of a defendant's social biography, consonant with his
new status. A resourceful judge can, through his subtle domination
of the proceedings, impose his will on the final outcome of a trial.
Stenographers and clerks, in their function as record keepers, are
on occasion pressed into service in support of a judicial need to
"rewrite" the record of a courtroom event. Bail practices are usually
employed for purposes other than simply assuring a defendant's
presence on the date of a hearing in connection with his case. Too
often, the discretionary power as to bail is part of the arsenal of
weapons available to collapse the resistance of an accused person.
The foregoing is a cursory examination of some of the more prominent
"short cuts" available to any court organization. There are numerous
other procedural strategies constituting due process deviations, which
tend to become the work style artifacts of a court's personnel. Thus,
only court "regulars" who are "bound in" are really accepted, others
being treated routinely and in an almost coldly correct manner.'6
V. TiB

RoLF, OF THE DEFENsE ATroRNaE

The defense attorneys, therefore, whether of the legal-aid, publicdefender variety, or privately retained, although operating in terms
of pressures specific to their respective role and organizational obligations, ultimately are concerned with strategies which tend to lead to a
guilty plea. It is the rational, impersonal elements involving economies
of time, labor, expense, and a superior commitment of defense counsel
to these rationalistic values of maximum production of court organization that prevail, rather than any particularistic, affective ties an
16. A more detailed examination of the criminal court as a social system, an
analysis of "bargaining" and its functions in the criminal court's organizational
structure, are set out in my forthcoming book, Criminal Justice, to be published by
Quadrangle Books, Chicago, Ill., Fall, 1967.
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accused may have reasonably expected to be the character of his
relationship with his lawyer.17 The lawyer "regulars" are frequently
former staff members of the prosecutor's office and utilize the charisma,
"know-how," and contacts of their former affiliation as part of their
stock in trade. But an accused and his kin, as with others outside the
court community, are unable to apprehend the nature and dimensions
of the close and continuing relations between the lawyer "regular"
and his former colleagues in the prosecutor's office. Their continuing
colleagueship is based on real professional and organizational needs of
a quid pro quo, which go beyond the limits of an accommodation or
modus vivendi one might ordinarily expect under the circumstances of
a seemingly adversary relationship. Indeed, the adversary features are
for the most part muted, and exist even in their attenuated form
largely for external consumption. The principals, lawyer and assistant
district attorney, rely upon one another's cooperation for their continued professional existence, and so the bargaining between them
usually tends to be "reasonable" rather than fierce.
A. The Fixing and Collecting of the Fee
1. The Lack of a Visible Product.-The real key to the comprehension of the role of defense counsel in a criminal case is to be
found in the fixing of the fee to be charged and its collection. The
problem of fixing and collecting the fee tends to influence the criminal
court process itself to a significant degree, not just the relationship
of the lawyer and his client. In essence, a lawyer-client "confidence
game" is played. 8 In many of the so-called "server-served" relationships for a fee, which include not only the practice of law, medicine,
or dentistry, but also plumbing, there is not always a visible endproduct or tangible service involved. Usually, a plumber will be
able to demonstrate empirically that he has performed a service by
clearing up the stuffed drain, repairing the leaky faucet or pipe-and
17. Three relatively recent items reported in the New York Times underscore this
point as it has manifested itself in one of the major criminal courts. In one instance
the Bronx County Bar Association condemned "mass assembly-line justice," which
"was rushing defendants into pleas of guilty and into convictions, in violation of their
legal rights." N.Y. Times, March 10, 1965, p. 51, col. 1. Another item, appearing
somewhat later that year, reports a judge criticizing his own court system (the
New York Criminal Court), that "pressure to set statistical records in disposing of
cases had hurt the administration of justice." N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1965, p. 49, col. 1.
A third, and most unusual recent public discussion in the press was a statement by a
leading New York appellate judge decrying "instant justice" which is employed to
reduce court calendar congestion ". . . converting our courthhouses into counting
houses . . . as in most big cities where the volume of business tends to overpower
court facilities." N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1966, p. 58, col. 2.
18. For a precise description of the phenomenon of the "con game" see Gasser,
The Confidence Game, Fed. Prob., Dec., 1963, p. 47.
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therefore merits his fee. He has rendered, when summoned, a visible,
tangible boon for his client in return for the requested fee. A
physician, who has not performed some visible surgery or otherwise
engaged in some readily discernible procedure in connection with a
patient, may be deemed by the patient to have "done nothing" for
him. As a consequence, medical practitioners may simply prescribe
or administer by injection a placebo to overcome a patient's potential
reluctance or dissatisfaction in paying a requested fee "for nothing."
In the practice of law there is a special problem in this regard, no
matter what the level of the practitioner or his place in the hierarchy
of prestige. Much legal work is intangible in its dimensions because
it is either simply a few words of advice, some preventive action, a
telephone call, negotiation of some kind, a form filled out and filed, a
hurried conference with another attorney or an official of a government agency, a letter or opinion written, or any of a countless variety
of seemingly innocuous and even prosaic procedures and actions.
These are the basic activities, apart from any possible court appearance, of almost all lawyers, at all levels of practice. Much of the
activity is not the exercise of the traditional, precise professional
skills of the attorney, such as library research and oral argument in
connection with appellate briefs, court motions, trial work, drafting
of opinions, memoranda, contracts, and other complex documents and
agreements. Instead, much legal activity, whether it is at the lowest
or highest "white shoe" law firm levels, is of the brokerage, agent,
sales representative, lobbyist type of activity, in which the lawyer acts
for someone else in pursuing the latter's interests and designs, furnishing an intangible service. 19
The attorneys in large-scale law firms may not speak as openly of
their "contacts," their "fixing" abilities, as do the lower-level lawyers.
For the large-firm lawyers trade instead upon a facade of thick
carpeting, walnut panelling, genteel low pressure, and superficialities
of traditional legal professionalism. 2° There are occasions when even
the large firm is on the defensive in connection with the fees it
charges because the services rendered or results obtained do not appear to merit the fee asked.2' Therefore, there is a recurrent problem
in the legal profession in fixing the amount of fee, and in justifying
the basis for the requested fee.
Although the fee at times amounts to what the traffic and the
conscience of the lawyer will bear, one further observation must be
19. CArmi-a, op. cit. supra note 14, passim; MILLs, WrE COLLAR 121-29 (1951).
20. For some of the characteristics of the "white shoe" law firm see Smigel, The
Impact of Recruitment on the Organization of the Large Law Firm, 25 Am. SociOLOGrCAL REv. 56 (1960).
21. S MGEL, THE WALL STRET LAwYEm 309 (1964).
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made with regard to the size of the fee and its collection. The
defendant in a criminal case and the material gain he may have
acquired during the course of his illicit activities are soon parted.
Not infrequently the ill-gotten fruits of various modes of larceny
are sequestered by a defense lawyer in payment of his fee. Inexorably, the amount of the fee is a function of the dollar value of the
crime committed, and is frequently set with meticulous precision at
a sum bearing an uncanny relationship to that of the net proceeds
of the offense involved. On occasion, defendants have been klown
to commit additional offenses while at liberty on bail, in order to
secure the requisite funds with which to meet their obligations for
payment of legal fees. Defense lawyers condition even the most obtuse
clients to recognize that there is a firm interconnection between fee
payment and the zealous exercise of professional expertise, secret
knowledge, and organizational "connections" in their behalf. Lawyers,
therefore, seek to keep their clients in a proper state of tension, and
to arouse in them the precise edge of anxiety which is calculated to
encourage prompt fee payment. Consequently, the client's attitude
in the relationship between defense counsel and an accused is in
many instances a precarious admixture of hostility, mistrust, dependence and sycophancy. By keeping his client's anxieties aroused to the
proper pitch, and establishing a seemingly causal relationship between a requested fee and the accused's ultimate extrication from
all onerous difficulties, the lawyer will have established the necessary preliminary groundwork to assure a minimum of haggling over
the fee and its eventual payment.
In varying degrees, as a consequence, all law practice involves a
manipulation of the client and a stage management of the lawyerclient relationship so that at least an appearance of help and service
will be forthcoming.22 This is accomplished in a variety of ways,
often exercised in combination with each other. At the outset, the
lawyer-professional employs with suitable variation a measure of salespuff which may range from an air of unbounded self-confidence,
adequacy, and dominion over events, to that of complete arrogance.
This will be supplemented by the affectation of a studied, faultless
mode of personal attire. In the larger firms, the furnishings and office
trappings will serve as the backdrop to help in impression management and client intimidation. In all firms, solo or large scale, an
access to secret knowledge, and to the seats of power and influence
is implied or presumed in varying degree as the basic vendible commodity of the practitioners.
22. For a systematic analysis of the "stage management" of persons and events see
GoFrmAx, TnE PRMENTATION

OF SELF xn

EVERYDAY LiFE

(1959).

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

The lack of a visible end-product offers a special complication in
the course of the professional life of the criminal court lawyer with
respect to his fee and in his relations with his client. The plain fact
is that an accused in a criminal case always "loses" even when he has
been exonerated by an acquittal, discharge, or dismissal of his case.
The hostility of an accused which follows as a consequence of his
arrest, incarceration, possible loss of job, expense and other traumas
connected with his case is directed, by means of displacement, toward
his lawyer, It is in this sense that it may be said that a criminal lawyer
never really "wins" a case. The really satisfied client is rare, since in
the very nature of the situation even an accused's vindication leaves
him with some degree of dissatisfaction and hostility. It is this state
of affairs that makes for a lawyer-client relationship in the criminal
court which tends to be a somewhat exaggerated version of the usual
lawyer-client confidence game.
2. Methods of Fee Collection.-At the outset, because there are
great risks of nonpayment of the fee, due to the impecuniousness of
his clients, and because of the fact that a man who is sentenced to
jail may be a singularly unappreciative client, the criminal lawyer
collects his fees in advance. Often, because the lawyer and the accused both have questionable designs of their own upon each other,
the confidence game can be played. The criminal lawyer must serve
three major functions, or, stated another way, he must solve three
problems. First, he must arrange for his fee; second, he must prepare
and then, if necessary, "cool out" his client in case of defeat (a
highly likely contingency); third, he must satisfy the court organization that he has performed adequately in the process of negotiating
the plea, so as to preclude the possibility of the occurrence of any
sort of embarrassing incident which may serve to invite "outside"
scrutiny.
In assuring the attainment of one of his primary objectives, his fee;
the criminal lawyer will very often enter into negotiations with
various members of the accused's kin group, including collatergl
relatives. In many instances, the accused himself is unable to ph
any sort of fee or anything more than a token fee. It then becomes
important to involve as many of the accused's kin group as possible
23. The social role and function of the lawyer can be therapeutic, helping his
client psychologically in giving him necessary emotional support at critical times.
The lawyer is also said to be acting as an agent of social control in the counselling
of his client and in the influencing of his course of conduct. PnSoNs, EssAYs ni
SocsoLocrcAL ThEony 382 (1954).

See Goffman, On Cooling the Mark Out: Some

Aspects of Adaptation to Failure, in HuAw- BEmAVIoR AND SocIAL PRoCESsES 482
(Rose ed. 1962). Goffman's "cooling out" analysis is especially relevant in the lawyeraccused client relationship.
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in the situation. This is especially so if the attorney hopes to collect
a significant part of a proposed substantial fee. It is not uncommon
for several relatives to contribute toward the fee. The larger the
group, the greater the possibility that the lawyer will collect a sizable
fee by exacting contributions from a diverse number of individuals.
A fee for a felony case which ultimately results in a guilty plea,
rather than a trial, may ordinarily range anywhere from 500 dollars
to 1,500 dollars. Should the case go to trial, the fee will be proportionately larger, depending upon the length of the trial. But the
larger the fee the lawyer wishes to exact, the more impressive his
performance must be, in terms of his stage-managed image of a
personage of great influence and power in the court organization.
Court personnel are keenly aware of the extent to which a lawyer's
stock in trade involves the precarious stage management of an image
which goes beyond the usual professional flamboyance, and for this
reason alone the lawyer is "bound in" to the authority system of the
court's organizational discipline. Therefore, to some extent, court
personnel will aid the lawyer in the creation and maintenance of
that impression. There is a tacit commitment to the lawyer by the
court organization, apart from formal etiquette, to aid him in this.
Such augmentation of the lawyer's stage-managed image is the partial
basis for the quid pro quo which exists between the lawyer and the
court organization. It tends to serve as the continuing basis for the
higher loyalty of the lawyer to the organization; his relationship with
his client, in contrast, is transient, ephemeral and often superficial.
B. The Defense Attorney as Agent-Mediator
The lawyer has often been accused of stirring up unnecessary
litigation, especially in the field of negligence. He is said to acquire
a vested interest in a cause of action or claim which was initially
his client's. The strong incentive of possible fees motivates the lawyer
to promote litigation which otherwise would never have developed.
The criminal lawyer develops a vested interest of an entirely different
nature in his client's case: not to promote the litigation, but to
limit its scope and duration. Only in this way can a case be "profitable." Thus, he enlists the aid of relatives not only to assure payment
of his fee, but he will also rely on these persons to help him in
his agent-mediator role of convincing the accused to plead guilty, and
ultimately to help him in "cooling out" the accused if necessary.
It is at this point that an accused-defendant may experience his
first sense of "betrayal." While he had perhaps perceived the police
and prosecutor to be adversaries, or possibly even a judge, the accused is wholly unprepared for his counsel's role performance as an
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agent-mediator. In the same vein, it is even less likely to occur to
an accused that members of his own family or kin group may become agents, albeit at the behest and urging of other agents or
mediators, acting on the principle that they are in reality helping
an accused negotiate the best possible plea arrangement under the
circumstances. Usually, it will be the lawyer who will activate next
of kin in this role, his ostensible motive being to arrange for his fee.
But soon latent and unstated motives will assert themselves, with
entreaties by counsel to the accused's next of kin, to appeal to the
accused to "help himself" by pleading. Gemeinschaft sentiments are
to this extent exploited by a defense lawyer (or even at times by a
district attorney) to achieve specific pragmatic ends, that is, of concluding a particular matter with all possible dispatch.
The fee is often collected in stages, each installment usually payable
prior to a necessary court appearance required during the course of
an accused's career journey. At each stage in his interviews and
communications with the accused and/or with members of his kin
group (if they are helping with the fee payment), the lawyer employs an air of professional confidence and "inside-dopesterism" in
order to assuage anxieties on all sides. He makes the necessary bland
assurances, and in effect manipulates his client, who is usually willing to do and say the things, true or not, which will help his attorney
extricate him. Since the dimensions of what he is selling-organizational influence and expertise-are not precisely measurable, the lawyer
can make extravagant claims of influence and secret knowledge with
impunity. Thus, lawyers frequently claim to have inside knowledge
in connection with information in the hands of the district attorney,
police, and probation officials, or to have access to these functionaries.
Factually, they often do, and need only to exaggerate the nature of
these relationships to obtain the desired effective impression upon the
client. But as in the genuine confidence game, the victim who has
participated is loathe to do anything which will upset the lesser plea
which his lawyer has "conned" him into accepting.2
24. The question has never been raised as to whether "bargain justice," "copping
a plea," or justice by negotiation is a constitutional process. Although it has become the most central aspect of the process of criminal law administration, it has received relatively little close scrutiny by the appellate courts. As a consequence, it is
relatively free of legal control and supervision. But in terms of the pressures and
devices that are employed which tend to violate due process of law, apart from any
questions of the legality of bargaining, there remain ethical and practical questions.
The system of bargain-counter justice is like the proverbial iceberg, much of its
danger being concealed in secret negotiations; and its least alarming feature, the final
plea, is the one presented to public view. See TrEBACH, Tnm RATONING OF JUsTICE
74-94 (1964), Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure
Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. Rv. 865 (1964).
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C. Cooperation Between the Judge and the Defense Attorney
In effect, in his role as double agent, the criminal lawyer performs
a vital and delicate mission for the court organization and the accused.
Both principals are anxious to terminate the litigation with a minimum
of expense and damage to each other. There is no other personage
or role incumbent in the total court structure more strategically lo'cated, who by training and in terms of his own requirements is more
ideally suited to do so than the lawyer. In recognition of this, judges
will cooperate with attorneys in many important ways. For example,
they will adjourn the case of an accused in jail awaiting plea or
sentence if the attorney requests such action. While this may be
done for some 'seemingly valid reason, the real purpose is that pressure is being applied by the attorney for the collection of his fee,
which he knows will probably not be forthcoming if the case is
concluded. Judges are aware of this tactic of lawyers who, by requesting an adjournment, keep an accused incarcerated longer as a
not-too-subtle method of dunning a client for payment. However,
judges usually go along with this, on the ground that important ends
of justice are being served. Often, the only end being served is to
protect a lawyer's fee.
In still another way the judge helps an accused's lawyer. He will
lend the official aura of his office and courtroom so that a lawyer can
stage manage an impression of an "all out" performance for the
accused in justification of his fee. The judge and other court personnel will serve as a backdrop for a scene charged with dramatic
fire, in which the accused's lawyer makes a stirring appeal in his
behalf. With a show of restrained passion, the lawyer will intone the
virtues of the accused and recite the social deprivations which have
reduced him to his present state. There is a speech which varies
somewhat depending on whether the accused has been convicted after
trial or has pleaded guilty. In the main, however, the incongruity,
superficiality and ritualistic character of the total performance is underscored by a visibly impassive, almost bored reaction on the part of
the judge and other members of the court retinue. Afterward, there
is a hearty exchange of pleasantries between the lawyer and district
attorney, wholly unrelated to the supposedly adversary nature of the
preceding events.
The fiery passion in defense of his client gone, the lawyers for both
sides resume their offstage relations, chatting amiably and perhaps
including the judge in their restrained banter. No other aspect of
their visible conduct so effectively serves to put even a casual observer
on notice that these individuals have claims upon each other. Their
seemingly innocuous actions are indicative of continuing organizational
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and informal relations, which, in their intricacy and depth, range far
beyond any priorities or claims a particular defendant may have.25

VI. Tim Bur1EAuCRATiC PRACnCE OF CmmhNAL LAw
Criminal law practice is a unique form of private law practice
since itreally only appears to be private practice.26 Actually, it is

bureaucratic practice, because of the lawyer's enmeshment in the
authority, discipline, and perspectives of the court organization. Sup-

posedly, private practice, in a professional sense, involves the maintenance of an organized, disciplined body of knowledge and learning;
the individual practitioners are imbued with a spirit of autonomy and
service; the earning of a livelihood is incidental. In the sense that
the lawyer in the criminal court is a double agent, serving higher
organizational rather than professional ends, he may be deemed to
be engaged in bureaucratic rather than private practice. To some

extent the lawyer-client "confidence game," in addition to its other
functions, serves to conceal this facty
A. The "Cop-out" Ceremony-Formal Entry of Guilty Plea

The "cop-out" ceremony, in which the court process culminates,
is not only invaluable for redefining the accused's perspectives of
himself, but also in reiterating publicly in a formally structured ritual
the accused person's guilt for the benefit of significant "others" who
are observing. The accused not only is made to assert publicly his
guilt of a specific crime, but also a complete recital of its details.
He is further made to indicate that he is entering his plea of guilty
25. For a conventional summary statement of some of the inevitable conflicting
loyalties encountered in the practice of law see, CATH_M, CASEs ON THE LFrAL
PnoumsioN 70-79 (1955).
26. Some lawyers at either end of the continuum of law practice appear to have
grave doubts as to whether it is indeed a profession at all. CA._aN, op. cit. supra
note 14, at 192; SMIGEL, op. cit. supra note 21, at 304-05. It is increasingly perceived
as a business with widespread evasion of the Canons of Ethics, duplicity and
chicanery being practiced in an effort to get and keep business. The poet Carl
Sandburg epitomized this notion in the following vignette: "Have you a criminal
lawyer in this burg"? "We think so but we haven't been able to prove it on him."
SANmBURG, THE PEoPLE, YEs 154 (1936).
27. While there is at times some element of dishonesty present in law practice
involving fee splitting, thefts from clients, influence peddling, fixing, questionable
use of favors and gifts to obtain business or influence others, this sort of activity is
most often attributed to the "solo" private-practice lawyer. See Wood, ProfessionalEthics
Among Criminal Lawyers, 7 Soc. PROB. 70 (1959). However, large "downtown" elite
firms also engage in these dubious activities to some degree. The difference is that
the latter firms enjoy a good deal of immunity from these charges because of their
near monopoly of the more desirable types of practice, and their great influence in the
political, economic and professional realms of power. See also CARLiN, LAwERas'
EnTcs passim (1966).
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freely, willingly and voluntarily, and that he is not doing so because
of any promises or in consideration of any commitments that may
have been made to him by anyone. This last is intended as a blanket
statement to shield the participants from any possible charges of
"coercion" or undue influence that may have been exerted in violation of due process requirements. Its function is to preclude any later
review by an appellate court on these grounds, and also to obviate
any second thoughts an accused may develop in connection with
his plea.
B. The Probation Interview-Defendant's Post-Plea Concept of Self
For the accused, however, the conception of self as a guilty person
is in large measure a temporary role adaptation. His career socialization as an accused, if it is successful, eventuates in his acceptance
and redefinition of himself as a guilty person.2 The transformation,
however, is ephemeral, in that he will quickly reassert his innocence
in private. What is important is that he accept his defeat, publicly
proclaim it, and find some measure of pacification in it.2 Almost immediately after his plea, a defendant will generally be interviewed
by a representative of the probation division in connection with a
pre-sentence report which is to be prepared. The very first question
to be asked of him by the probation officer is: "Are you guilty of the
crime to which you pleaded"? This is by way of double affirmation
of the defendant's guilt. Should the defendant now begin to make
bold assertions of his innocence, despite his plea of guilty, he will
28. This does not mean that most of those who plead guilty are innocent of any
crime. Indeed, in many instances those who have been able to negotiate a lesser
plea have done so willingly and even eagerly. The system of justice-by-negotiation,
without trial, probably tends to serve the interests and requirements of guilty persons,
who are thereby presented with formal alternatives of compensation by way of a
more favorable plea and sentence. Having observed the prescriptive etiquette in
compliance with the defendant role expectancies in this setting, he is rewarded. An
innocent person, on the other hand, is confronted with the same set of role prescriptions, structures and legal alternatives. Going to trial is not always a feasible
possibility; in addition, there is the problem of conviction-prone juries.
29. "Any communicative network between persons whereby the public identity
of an actor is transformed into something looked on as lower in the local scheme of
social types will be called a 'status degradation ceremony.'" Garfinkel, Conditions of
Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61 AM. J. Soc. 420, 424 (1956). But contrary
to the conception of the "cop out!' as a "status degradation ceremony" is the fact
that it is in reality a charade, during the course of which an accused must project an
appropriate and acceptable amount of guilt, penitence and remorse. Having adequately
feigned the role of the "guilty person" his hearers will engage in the fantasy that be
is contrite, and thereby merits a lesser penalty. One of the essential functions of the
criminal lawyer is that he coach and direct his accused-client in the role performance.
Thus, what is actually involved is not a "degradation" process at all, but is instead,
a highly structured system of exchange cloaked in the rituals of legalism and public
professions of guilt and repentance.
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be asked to withdraw his plea and stand trial on the original charges.
Such a theatened possibility is in most instances sufficient to cause
an accused to let the plea stand and to request the probation officer
to overlook his exclamations of innocence. The table that follows is
a breakdown of the categorized responses of a random sample of
male defendants in Metropolitan Court"0 during 1962, 1963 and 1964
in connection with their statements during pre-sentence probation
interviews following their plea of guilty:
TABLE I
DEFENDANT RESPONSES AS TO GUILT OR INNOCENCE
AFTER PLEADING
YEARS-1962, 1963, 1964
NO.-724
NATURE OF RESPONSE

NO. OF DEFENDANTS

INNOCENT
(Manipulated)

"The lawyer or judge, police or
DA 'conned' me.

INNOCENT
(Pragmatic)

%

86

(11.9)

"Wanted to get it over with."
"You can't beat the system."
"They have you over a barrel
when you have a record."

147

(20.3)

INNOCENT
(Advice of counsel)

"Followed my lawyer's advice."

92

(12.7)

INNOCENT
(Defiant)

"Framed."-betrayed by "Complainant," "Police," "Squealers,"
"Lawyer," "Friends," "Wife,"
"Girlfriend."

33

(4.6)

Blames probation officer or
psychiatrist for "Bad Report,"
in cases where there was prepleading investigation.

15

(2.1)

GUILTY

"But I should have gotten a
better deal." Blames lawyer,
DA, police, judge.

74

(10.2)

GUILTY

"Won't say anything further."

(2.9)

FATALISTIC
(Doesn't press his
"Innocence," won't
admit "Guilt.")

"I did it for convenience."
"My lawyer told me it was only
thing I could do."
"I did it because it was the best
way out."

(34.2)

INNOCENT
(Adverse social data)

NO RESPONSE
TOTAL

8
724

(1.1)
100.0%

30. The actual court which served as the universe from which these data were
drawn is one of the largest criminal courts in the United States, dealing with
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It would be well to observe at the outset that of the 724 defendants
who pleaded guilty before trial, only 43 (5.9%) of the total group had
confessed prior to their indictment. Thus, the ultimate judicial process
was predicated upon evidence independent of any confession of the
accused.31

As the data indicate, only a relatively small number (95) out of
the total number of defendants will even admit their guilt, following
the "cop-out" ceremony. Even though they affirmed their guilt, however, many of these defendants felt that they should have been able
to negotiate a more favorable plea. The largest aggregate of defendants (373) were those who reasserted their "innocence" following
their public profession of guilt during the "cop-out" ceremony. These
defendants employed differential degrees of fervor, solemnity and
credibility, ranging from mild, wavering assertions of innocence which
were embroidered with a variety of stock explanations and rationalizations, to those of an adamant, "framed" nature. Thus, the "innocent"
group for the most part, it must be stressed, were largely concerned
with underscoring for their probation interviewer their essential "goodness" and "worthiness," despite their formal plea of guilty. Assertion of
his innocence at the post plea stage resurrects a more respectable and
acceptable self-concept for the accused defendant who has pleaded
guilty. A recital of the structural exigencies which precipitated his
plea of guilt serves to embellish a newly proffered claim of innocence,
which many defendants mistakenly feel will stand them in good stead
at the time of sentence, or ultimately with probation or parole authorities.
Relatively few (33) maintained their innocence in terms of having
been "framed" by some person or agent-mediator, although a larger
number (86) indicated that they had been manipulated or "conned"
by an agent-mediator to plead guilty, but, as indicated, their assertions
of innocence were relatively mild.
A rather substantial group (147) preferred to stress the pragmatic
aspects of their plea of guilty. They assert their innocence only perfelonies only. Female defendants in the years 1950 through 1964 constituted from
7 to 10% of the totals for each year.
31. My own data in this connection appear to support Sobel's conclusion, see note
6 supra, and appear to be at variance with the prevalent view, which stresses the
importance of confessions in law enforcement and prosecution. All the persons in
my sample were originally charged with felonies ranging from homicide to forgery.
In most instances the original felony charges were reduced to misdemeanors by way
of a negotiated lesser plea. The vast range of crime categories which are available
facilitates the patterned court process of plea reduction to a lesser offense, which
is also usually a socially less opprobrious crime. For an illustration of this feature of
-the bargaiiffg process in a court utilizing a public defender office see Sudnow, Normal
Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public Defender Office, 12 SOCIL
PRoBLEMs 255 (1964).
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functorily and in general refer to some adverse aspect of their situ-'
ation which they believed tended negatively to affect their bargainingleverage, including in some instances a prior criminal record.
One group of defendants (92), while maintaining their innocence,
simply employed some variation of a theme of following "the advice
of counsel" as a covering response, to explain their guilty plea in the
light of their new affinmation of innocence. It was a shorthand method
of invoking a catch phrase to preclude any further discussion of an
otherwise seemingly inconsistent position.
The largest single group of defendants (248) were basically fatalistic. They only verbalized weak suggestions of their innocence in
rather halting terms, wholly without conviction. By the same token,
they did not admit guilt readily and were generally evasive as to
guilt or innocence, preferring to stress aspects of their stoic submission
in their decision to plead. This sizable group of -defendants appeared
to perceive the total court process as being caught up in a monstrous
organizational apparatus, in which the defendant's role expectancies
were not clearly defined. Reluctant to offend anyone in authority,
fearful that clear-cut statements on their part as to their guilt or
innocence would be negatively construed, they adopted a stance of
passivity, resignation and acceptance. Interestingly, in most instances
they invoked their lawyer as being the one who crystallized the available alternatives for them, and who was, therefore, the critical element
in their decision-making process.
C. The Role of Agent-Mediator in Defendant's Guilty Plea
In order to determine which agent-mediator was most influential
in altering the accused's perspectives as to his decision to plead- or
go to trial (regardless of the proposed 'basis of the plea), the same
sample of defendants were asked to indicate the person who first suggested to them that they plead guilty. They were also asked to indi-,
cate which of those who made such a suggestion was most influential
in affecting their final decision to plead.
It is popularly assumed that the police, through forced confessions,
and the district attorney, employing still other pressures, are most
instrumental in the inducement of an accused to plead guilty. As
32. Failures, shortcomings and oppressive features of our system of criminal justice
have been attributed to a variety of sources including 'lawless" police, overzealous
district attorneys, "hanging" juries, corruption and political connivance, incompetent
judges, inadequacy or lack of counsel, and poverty or other social disabilities of the
defendant. See BARTa, LAw EaRcmmNT Vas-Us =HE LAw (1963), for a journalist's
account embodying this point of view. See also Sno~rscx JusvicE WrrnouT TmRL:
LAw EI41oca n n ni D.EmocmA~rc SocI-rY (1966), for a sociologist's excellent

study of the role of the police in criminal law administration.

For a somewhat
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Table II indicates, it is actually the defendant's own counsel who is
most effective in this role. Further, this phenomenon tends to reinforce the extremely rational nature of criminal law administration,
for an organization could not rely upon the sort of idiosyncratic
measures employed by the police to induce confessions, and still maintain its efficiency, high production and overall rational-legal character. The defense counsel becomes the ideal agent-mediator since as
"officer of the court" and confidant of the accused and his kin group,
he lives astride both worlds and can serve the ends of the two as well
as his own.P
The following table indicates the breakdown of the responses to the
two questions:
TABLE II
ROLE OF AGENT-MEDIATORS IN DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA
PERSON OR
OFFICIAL

JUDGE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
DEFENSE COUNSEL

PROBATION OFFICER
PSYCHIATRIST
RELATIVE (WIFE)
FRIENDS AND
OTHER RELATIVES
POLICE
FELLOW INMATES
OTHERS

"NO RESPONSE"
TOTAL

FIRST SUGGESTED
PLEA OF GUILTY

4
67

(.6)

INFLUENCED THE
ACCUSED MOST IN
HIS FINAL DECISION
TO PLEAD

(9.3)

26
116

( 3.6)
(16.0)

(56.2)

411

(56.7)

14
8
34

(1.9)
(1.1)
(4.7)

3
1
120

(.4)
(.1)

21
14
119

( 2.9)

14
4
14

(1.9)

407

(1.9)
(16.4)

(16.6)

(.6)
(1.9)

28

(3.9)

5

(.7)

8

(1.1)

10

(1.4)

724' 100.0%

724

99.9%*

Rounded to nearest tenth.

While an accused's wife, for example, may be influential in making
him more amenable to a plea, her agent-meditor role has usually
been sparked and initiated by defense counsel. Further, although a
number of first suggestions of a plea came from an accused's fellow
technical discussion of American police procedures, see LAFAvE, An uaT: THE DEcisioN
TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY (1965).
,33. Aspects of the lawyer's ambivalences with regard to the expectancies of the

various groups who have claims upon him are discussed in a paper by Hubert J.
O'Gornan, "The Ambivalence of Lawyers," Eastern Sociological Association Meeting,
1
April 10, 1965.
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jail inmates, he tended to rely largely on his counsel as an ultimatesource of influence in his final decision.
D. The Stage at Which Defense Counsel Suggested Guilty Plea
Since the defense counsel is a crucial figure in the total organizational scheme in constituting a new set of perspectives for the accused, the same sample of defendants was asked to indicate at which
stage of their contact with counsel was the suggestion of a plea made.
There are three basic kinds of defense counsel available in Metropolitan Court: Legal-aid, privately retained counsel, and counsel
assigned by the court (who may eventually be privately retained by
the accused).
TABLE III
STAGE AT WHICH COUNSEL SUGGESTED ACCUSED TO PLEAD
NO.-724
CONTACT

COUNSEL TYPE
PRIVATELY
RETAINED

LEGAL-AID

ASSIGNED

FIRST

66

(34.7)

237

(48.6)

28

(59.6)

SECOND

83

(43.7)

142

(29.1)

8

(17.0)

THIRD

29

(15.3)

63

4

( 8.5)

FOURTH OR MORE
NO RESPONSE

12
0

( 6.3)
( 0.0)

31
14

(12.9)
(6.4)

5
2

(10.6)
( 4.3)

47

100.0%

TOTAL
o

190

100.0%

487

(2.9)
99.9%4*

Rounded to nearest tenth.

The overwhelming majority of accused persons, regardless of type
of counsel, related a specific incident which indicated an urging or
suggestion, during either the first or second contact, that they plead
guilty to a lesser charge if this could be. arranged. Of all the agentmediators, it is the lawyer who is most effective in manipulating an
accused's perspectives, not withstanding pressures that may have been
previously applied by police, district attorney, judge or any of the
agent-mediators that may have been activated by them. Legal-aid and
assigned counsel are apparently more likely to suggest a possible plea
at the initial interview as response to pressures of time; and in the
case of assigned counsel, the strong possibility that there is no fee
involved may be an added impetus to such a suggestion at the first
contact.
There is some further evidence in Table III of the perfunctory,
ministerial character of the system in Metropolitan Court and similar
criminal courts. There is little real effort to individualize, and the
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lawyer's role as agent-mediator may be seen as unique in that he is in
effect a double agent. Although, as "officer of the court," he mediates
between the court organization and the defendant, his roles with respect to each are rent by conflicts of interest. Too often these must
be resolved in favor of the organization which provides him with the
means for his professional existence. Consequently, in order to reduce the strains and conflicts imposed in what is ultimately an overdemanding role obligation for him, the lawyer engages in the lawyerclient "confidence game" so as to structure more favorably an otherwise onerous role system.3
VII. CONCLUSIONS-CovERT CONTINGENCIES INT11E
BIGHT TO CotrNsEL

Based on data which are admittedly tentative and fragmentary, the
furor over confessions, whether of the coerced or voluntary variety,
appears to be not too meaningful. It is suggested that the process
of criminal law enforcement has always depended, and will continue
to do so in the foreseeable future, on confessions obtained judicially
in open court (i.e., pleas of guilty), rather than on confessions, wrung
from an accused in the back room of a police station. The Gideon,
Escobedo and Miranda decisions have been regarded in legal circles
as a most important development in American jurisprudence. No
doubt, in time, the various states will make administrative provisions
to implement the legal principles established in those cases. Although
there has been great enthusiasm expressed in connection with these
decisions, my limited data appear to suggest that results at the felony
level in the criminal courts will not be significantly different from
those which presently obtain in the respective communities affected
by these cases. While it is true that at the "gatehouse" occasional
defendants may be able to avoid prosecution by standing mute after
being advised of their rights, many will, nevertheless, reach the
"mansion-and there we are dealing with an entirely different organizational context.
The organizational, occupational, and structural variables of the
criminal court will continue to be present, and perhaps be even further
augmented, in addition to any race, class, ethnic or other socio-demographic dimensions which are to be found in the respective jurisdictions. Together, these are formidable. The organizational features
which. in the pursuit of rationality, efficiency and maximum production tend to promote the present system of criminal justice, will not
be easily overcome by additional counsel and similar resources, for
"84. Goode, AXThe6ry of. Role Strain, 25 Am. SOCIOLOGICAL 1 v. 483 (1960);
Snoek,--Role Strainti, Diversified Role Sets, 71 Am. I. Soc. 363 (1966).
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they may in turn be co-opted and become part of the organizational
structure, if they are not already.35 It must always be remembered
that the organizational network of the criminal court stands interposed between the most libertarian rules and the accused person.
The rules as enunciated by the Supreme Court are based on the supposed existence of an adversary model of criminal justice. But the
adversary model has been compromised and modified as inappropriate
in terms of the values of maximum production and efficiency that are
being sought. The additional resources and personnel which will be
required to implement these rules will simply serve to strengthen
and increase the efficiency of the present system of criminal justice in
producing a greater number of guilty pleas. Courts, like many other
modem large-scale organizations, possess a montrous appetite for the
co-optation of entire professional groups as well as individuals. Almost all those coming within the ambit of organizational authority
find that their definitions, perceptions and values have been refurbished, largely in terms favorable to the particular organization and
its goals. As a result, recent Supreme Court decisions may have a
long-range effect which is radically different from that intended or
anticipated. The more libertarian rules will tend to produce the
rather ironic end result of augmenting the existing organizational arrangements, enriching court. organizations with more personnel and
elaborate structure, which in turn will serve to maximize organizational goals of "efficiency" and "production." Thus, many defendants will find that courts will possess an even more sophisticated apparatus for processing them toward a guilty plea!
35. Some of the resources which hzve become an integral part of our courts, e.g.,
psychiatry, social work and probation, were originally intended as part of an ameliorative, therapeutic effort to individualize offenders. However, there is some evidence
that a quite different result obtains from the one originally intended. The ameliorative
instruments have been co-opted by the court in order to deal more "efficiently" -with
a court's caseload, often to the legal disadvantage of an accused person. See ALLEN,
TimE BoRDEnLAND OF CRIVINAL JUSTIcE passim (1964). SZAsz, LAW, LaERry_,AND
PsYcarTnaY (1963).

See also Szasz's most recent work, SzAsz, PsYcarAnuc JusTIcE

(1965); Diana, The Rights of Juvenile Delinquents: An Appraisal of Juvenile'Court
Procedures, 47 J.COum. L., C & P.S. 561-69 (1957).

